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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

66011

DRAFTED BY: S/S-O:DJONES

APPROVED BY: S/S-O:LMACFARLANE

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P 162006Z JAN 76

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO CINCLANT PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USDOCOSOUTH PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 011553

EXDIS MILITARY ADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FOLLOWING REPEAT NATO 0232 ACTION SECSTATE LISBON 16 JAN

DTG 161702Z

QUOTE

S E C R E T USNATO 0232

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE FROM AMBASSADOR BRUCE.

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS CINCLANT, JCS, SECDEF, USCINCEUR,

USNMR SHAPE, USDOCOSOUTH

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, MPOL, NATO, PO

SUBJ: PORTUGUESE FORCE DEVELOPMENT: AN ACTION PROPOSAL

SUMMARY: BASED ON MUTUALLY INFORMATIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH AM-

BASSADOR CARLUCCI, WE BELIEVE THAT THE TIME IS OPPORTUNE FOR

THE US TO HELP THE PORTUGUESE DEVELOP A TIME-PHASED FORCE

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DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WHICH WILL REORIENT PORTUGUESE FORCES

TOWARD A MODEST BUT ENHANCED CONTRIBUTION TO NATO. THE PURPOSE

OF THIS CABLE IS TO SUGGEST HOW THE US, WITHIN THE ALLIANCE,

COULD BEST TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS OPPORTUNITY. WHILE A

PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF SUCH A REDEFINED FORCE PROGRAM WOULD BE ITS CONTRIBUTION TO POLITICAL STABILITY THROUGH IMPROVED MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM, WE BELIEVE THAT IT SHOULD ALSO GIVE DUE WEIGHT TO THE SIZE AND KINDS OF FORCES WHICH CAN REASONABLY BE SUPPORTED AND, MOST IMPORTANTLY, TO THE ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS OF THE US AND ALLIES TO PROVIDE EQUIPMENT AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE PORTUGUESE. THE EMERGING MILITARY COMMITTEE FORCE PROPOSALS FOR PORTUGAL CAN PROVIDE A START AT THE TYPE OF REDEFINITION WE HAVE IN MIND. I RECOMMEND THAT WASHINGTON ASK CINCEUR AND CINCLANT TO DEVELOP FURTHER THESE FORCE PROPOSALS INTO AN ILLUSTRATIVE PROGRAM. THIS PROGRAM WOULD SHOW IN SOME DETAIL HOW THE DEVELOPMENT OF PORTUGUESE FORCES MIGHT BE TIME-PHASED TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM BENEFITS IN TERMS OF THE PRIORITIES WE SET OUT BELOW, AT AN AFFORDABLE COST. USNATO AND APPROPRIATE EMBASSIES WOULD USE THE PROGRAM FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH APPROPRIATE ALLIANCE MEMBERS TO DETERMINE THE DEGREE OF THEIR POSSIBLE SUPPORT FOR PORTUGUESE FORCE DEVELOPMENT. THIS ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS WOULD THEN PROVIDE A CONCRETE BASIS FOR DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN AMBASSADOR CARLUCCI AND THE PORTUGUESE. WE WOULD ENVISION CONCRETE RESULTS BY THE TIME THE DEFENSE REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC) EXAMINES THE MILITARY COMMITTEE FORCE PROPOSALS FOR PORTUGAL (MID-APRIL). AMBASSADOR CARLUCCI AND GENERAL HAIG JOIN ME IN SUPPORTING THESE RECOMMENDATIONS. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON VIEWS. END SUMMARY.

1. WE HAVE RECENTLY CONCLUDED EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH AMBASSADOR CARLUCCI ON THE SITUATION IN PORTUGAL AND THE PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVED STABILITY THROUGH THE LONG-TERM RESTRUCTURING OF PORTUGUESE ARMED FORCES. WE WERE STRUCK IN THE COURSE OF OUR DISCUSSIONS BY THE DEGREE TO WHICH OPPORTUNITIES APPEAR TO HAVE IMPROVED RECENTLY FOR INITIATIVES WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE AND PERMIT THE PORTUGUESE ARMED FORCES TO RECEDE FROM DIRECT POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT, TO CONTINUE TO UNDERPIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND TO TURN TOWARD A POST-COLONIAL CONCEPT OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM THROUGH A MODEST BUT POSITIVE AND WELL-PLANNED MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO NATO. WE BELIEVE THAT THE SHORT-TERM MEASURES

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ABOUT TO BE INITIATED, INVOLVING CONTACTS BETWEEN THE PORTUGUESE MILITARY AND THEIR US AND ALLIED COUNTERPARTS, ARE EXCELLENT BUT OF LIMITED IMPACT. IN THE LONGER TERM, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO REDEFINE PORTUGAL'S NATO ROLES AND CAREFULLY TO PROGRAM ACQUISITIONS OF EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR PORTUGAL TO ACHIEVE THEM.

2. AS EMBASSY LISBON READS THEIR PREDOMINANT MOOD AND IMPULSE, THE LEADERS AND RISING ELITES OF THE PORTUGUESE MILITARY RECOGNIZE THE NEED TO RE-EMPHASIZE A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY ROLE. THEY, PARTICULARLY THE PRIME MINISTER (WHOSE POLITICAL STOCK IS RISING), LOOK INSTINCTIVELY TO NATO AS THE FOUNDATION UPON WHICH TO BUILD SUCH A REDEFINED ROLE. AT THE SAME TIME, BOTH THE POLITICAL AND THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP UNDERSCORE THE IMPORTANCE OF AN EFFECTIVE

INTERNAL SECURITY FORCE.

3. THE PORTUGUESE MILITARY KNOW THAT THEY NEED TO REORIENT THEIR MILITARY ROLES AND THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF ADEQUATE NATIONAL BUDGETARY RESOURCES, THEY WILL REQUIRE FINANCIAL HELP FROM THEIR ALLIES TO ACQUIRE MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT. HOWEVER, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY ARE PREPARING "EQUIPMENT LISTS" FOR AMBASSADOR CARLUCCI, THEY HAVE VIRTUALLY NO EXPERIENCE IN PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING. AMBASSADOR CARLUCCI BELIEVES THEY WILL ACCEPT US ASSISTANCE AND ADVICE IN RESHAPING THEIR FORCES AND MISSIONS. THEIR "EQUIPMENT LISTS" CAN BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME, BUT SHOULD NOT DELAY THE START OF THIS ASSISTANCE AND ADVICE.

4. WE SUGGEST THAT ANY RESTRUCTURING AND RE-EQUIPPING OF PORTUGUESE FORCES SHOULD FOLLOW THESE GUIDELINES:

- THEY SHOULD MAKE A REAL CONTRIBUTION TO NATO.
- THEY SHOULD NOT BE LARGER THAN NEEDED FOR INTERNAL SECURITY AND A CLEARLY IDENTIFIABLE CONTRIBUTION TO NATO FORCES.
- THEY SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO INCREASED POLITICAL STABILITY BY RESTORING DISCIPLINE IN THE PORTUGUESE MILITARY THROUGH PROFESSIONAL MILITARY ACCOMPLISHMENT.
- THEY SHOULD BE BASED ON A CONCEPT OF "MINIMUM ESSENTIAL" TECHNOLOGY, CAPITAL INVESTMENT AND OPERATING COSTS. THIS IS NECESSARY, WE BELIEVE:

(A) IF THE RESULTING FORCES ARE TO BE MAINTAINED IN THE CONTEXT OF A RUPTURED PORTUGUESE ECONOMY, AND
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(B) IF THE REQUIREMENT FOR EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE IS NOT TO EXCEED THE ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS OF THE US AND OTHER ALLIES TO PROVIDE IT.

5. THE PORTUGUESE ARMY, IN OUR VIEW, SHOULD RECEIVE PRIORITY ATTENTION IN RESTRUCTURING. SINCE IN THE AFTERMATH OF WITHDRAWAL FROM AFRICA IT IS WITHOUT A CREDIBLE PROFESSIONAL MISSION, IT LOOKS NATURALLY TOWARD EUROPE FOR A ROLE. AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS INHERENTLY THE MILITARY SERVICE WITH THE LARGEST INFLUENCE ON INTERNAL STABILITY. FOR THE PORTUGUESE AIR FORCE, THE MOST PRO-WESTERN SERVICE, THE URGENT PROBLEM IS LITERALLY TO PRESERVE IT, SINCE IT IS VIRTUALLY WITHOUT EQUIPMENT FOR EITHER ITS AIR OR MARITIME ROLES. THE SURFACE NAVY ALREADY HAS A VALID MISSION, WHICH WE BELIEVE SHOULD REMAIN ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED. THUS WE ENVISAGE A RETTSTRUCTURING WHICH WOULD TIE THE ARMY TO NATO, PRESERVE THE PRO-NATO AIR FORCE, AND MAINTAIN TRADITIONAL PORTUGUESE NAVAL ROLES.

6. THE MNC FORCE PROPOSALS 1977-82, PRESENTLY BEING REVIEWED IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, PROVIDE AN OUTLINE FOR THE TYPES OF FORCES WHICH ARE DESIRABLE, AND FURNISH SOME COSTS. THEY ARE, HOWEVER, VERY BROAD IN SCOPE AND PRIORITY. FURTHERMORE, THEY DO NOT SPECIFY

CONCRETELY HOW PORTUGUESE FORCE DEVELOPMENT PLANS MIGHT BE PROGRAMMED TO YIELD MAXIMUM BENEFIT AT AFFORDABLE COST. THIS IS PARTICULARLY NECESSARY IN THE CASE OF PORTUGAL, BOTH BECAUSE OF PORTUGAL'S INEXPERIENCE IN FORCE PLANNING AND BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT ALLIES OTHER THAN PORTUGAL WILL HAVE TO PAY MANY OF THE BILLS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE PROPOSALS CALL FOR DEVELOPMENT OF AN AIR TRANSPORTABLE LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE FOR THE ARMY, AND FOR A BATTALION-SIZED CONTRIBUTION TO THE ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE MOBILE FORCE; THEY NEED TO BE FURTHER DEVELOPED FOR THE PORTUGUESE TO SHOW HOW IT MIGHT BE ECONOMICALLY FEASIBLE TO FORM AND EQUIP THE AMF CONTRIBUTION AT AN EARLY DATE, PERHAPS AS THE LEAD UNIT OF THE BRIGADE. IN THIS REGARD, IT WOULD BE MOST USEFUL IF SACEUR COULD INFORM GENERAL EANES (CHIEF OF STAFF, PORTUGUESE ARMY), DURING HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO SHAPE (FEBRUARY 23-24), THAT HE AND THE SHAPE STAFF SUPPORT SUCH A SPECIAL PORTUGUESE ARMY UNIT.

7. WE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING ACTION-ORIENTED PROGRAM AS A MATTER

OF URGENCY:

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(A) WASHINGTON TO ASK CINCEUR AND CINCLANT TO REVIEW THE MC FORCE PROPOSALS 1977-82 FOR PORTUGAL (WHICH THEY INITIALLY FORMULATED UNDER THEIR ALLIED HATS) FOR CONSISTENCY WITH THE CRITERIA SUGGESTED ABOVE.

(B) WASHINGTON ALSO TO ASK CINCEUR AND CINCLANT TO DEVELOP A TIME-PHASED ILLUSTRATIVE PROGRAM FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE REVISED FORCE PROPOSALS, WITH PRIORITY TO THOSE MEASURES WHICH CAN BE EXPECTED TO PRODUCE EARLIEST BENEFICIAL RESULTS IN IMPROVED DISCIPLINE THROUGH INCREASED MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM.

(C) FOLLOWING WASHINGTON APPROVAL OF THESE REVISED FORCE PROPOSALS AND THE TIME-PHASED ILLUSTRATIVE PROGRAM, USNATO AND APPROPRIATE US EMBASSIES TO DISCUSS THEM WITH ALLIANCE MEMBERS TO DETERMINE THE DEGREE OF POSSIBLE ALLIED ASSISTANCE. THE US WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO INDICATE AT THE TIME OF THESE CONSULTATIONS THE DEGREE OF ANTICIPATED US SUPPORT.

(D) BASED ON THESE CONSULTATIONS, EMBASSY LISBON TO DISCUSS THE PROPOSED PROGRAM WITH THE GOP. WE WOULD HOPE THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS COULD TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE DEFENSE REVIEW COMMITTEE EXAMINES THE MILITARY COMMITTEE FORCE PROPOSALS FOR PORTUGAL (MID-APRIL).

(E) DURING DRC AND, LATER, DPC CONSIDERATION OF NATO FORCE PROPOSALS, US AND ALLIES TO SEEK OFFICIAL VALIDATION OF THE REVISED PROGRAM, INCLUDING UNDERTAKINGS BY THE US AND OTHER ALLIES TO FUND IT.

8. AN APPROACH ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED ABOVE, WE BELIEVE, COULD PRODUCE A NEW PORTUGUESE FORCE CONTRIBUTION WHICH MAKES BOTH POLI-

TICAL AND MILITARY SENSE. AMBASSADOR CARLUCCI AND GENERAL HAIG
JOIN ME IN SUPPORTING THESE RECOMMENDATIONS. WE WOULD WELCOME
EARLY WASHINGTON REACTIONS.BRUCE UNQUOTE KISSINGER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 15 SEP 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MILITARY ASSISTANCE, MILITARY BUILDUP, ALLIANCE, MILITARY CAPABILITIES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 JAN 1976
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: MartinML
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976STATE011553
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: S/S-O:DJONES
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D760017-0756
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760199/baaaenyd.tel
Line Count: 222
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: MartinML
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 13 JAN 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <13 JAN 2004 by morefirh>; APPROVED <28 JUL 2004 by MartinML>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: PORTUGUESE FORCE DEVELOPMENT: AN ACTION PROPOSAL SUMMARY: BASED ON MUTUALLY INFORMATIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH AM-
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, PO, US, NATO
To: CINCLANT
USCINCEUR
USNMR SHAPE
USDOCOSOUTH
Type: TE

Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006